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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOSE LUIS C. VICENTE, : Case No. 20000955-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah sentenced Defendant/Appellant Jose Luis C. Vicente 
("Appellant" or "Vicente") and entered judgment of conviction for possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, a class A misdemeanor. A copy of the Judgment is in 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION 
Issue. Whether the trial judge violated due process, Appellant's right to appear 
and defend, and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 when he sentenced Appellant in absentia to the 
maximum sentence without affording defense counsel or the state an opportunity to speak 
at sentencing. 
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996) (issue of whether 
defendant was properly sentenced in absentia involves a question of law). In addition, the 
ultimate issue as to whether Appellant voluntarily absented himself from sentencing is 
reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah App. 
1996) (reviewing ultimate issue of whether consent to search was voluntary for 
correctness). While a trial judge ordinarily has discretion in sentencing, such discretion is 
not unlimited. See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) (recognizing trial 
court exceeds its discretion when it fails to sentence based on reliable and relevant 
information, and reviewing question of whether trial judge sentenced defendant based on 
reliable and relevant information as a question of law). Any underlying factual findings 
are reviewed for clear error. See generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) 
(factual findings are reviewed for clear error). 
Preservation. Although defense counsel was not given an opportunity to speak, the 
trial court nevertheless considered the issue of whether it was appropriate to proceed, and 
concluded that Appellant had voluntarily absented himself (R. 67[2]:l-2). A copy of the 
sentencing transcript is in Addendum B. The trial judge had considered this issue before, 
as indicated in his statement, "this is yet another sentencing on which we have neither an 
appearance of the defendant or a report" (R. 67[2]:1). He sentenced Manuel Samora, 
whose appeal is before this Court in Case No. 20000884-CA, on the same day. In 
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addition, trial counsel filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, a copy of which is in 
Addendum C. 
The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, a copy of which is 
in Addendum D (R. 48-49). In fact, although the parties were never given the opportunity 
to address the issue of whether proceeding in absentia was appropriate under the 
circumstances of the case, the prosecutor was able to prepare findings and conclusions on 
that issue. Because the trial court considered this issue below and entered an order, it is 
properly preserved for appellate review. See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 
1989) (purpose of requiring that an issue be raised in the trial court is to allow the trial 
judge to review the issue and correct an error).1 
Alternatively, the trial judge committed plain error in proceeding in absentia and in 
failing to base the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information without 
affording defense counsel the opportunity to speak. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071; Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22; State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (plain error occurs 
1
 The purposes of the preservation rules are to: (1) allow the trial court the 
opportunity to review and correct any errors, and (2) preclude defense counsel from 
foregoing objections as a matter of strategy and when the strategy does not work and 
defendant is convicted, claiming error. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 36; State v. Labrum. 925 
P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
497 U.S. 1024 (1990). In this case where the trial judge reviewed the issue of whether to 
proceed in absentia at sentencing and entered findings and conclusions on that issue and 
again had the opportunity to review the issue when the motion to correct an illegal 
sentence was filed, both of those purposes were met. The trial court had the opportunity 
to review the issue and correct the error, and no possible trial strategy existed for 
foregoing the objection. Accordingly, the issue was properly preserved for appeal. 
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when an error is obvious and prejudices the defendant). State v. Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 
1247 (Utah 1980) (due process requires foil and fair sentencing hearing and sentence 
which fits offender and the crime); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985) (state due 
process requires that sentence be based on reliable and relevant information regarding 
various factors). Pursuant to due process and Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a), the error in failing 
to conduct a foil sentencing hearing was obvious as was the denial of Vicente's right to 
presence at sentencing pursuant to Article I, section 12, Utah Constitution. The obvious 
error prejudiced Vicente since he received the maximum sentence when he otherwise was 
a candidate for probation; see discussion infra at 11. 
Finally, the issue should also be reviewed because exceptional circumstances 
justifying review exist in this case. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996). 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) requires a trial judge to afford defendant the opportunity to 
provide relevant information at sentencing; due process requires the judge to conduct a 
foil and fair sentencing hearing. See e ^ Lipskv, 608 P.2d at 1247. Where the judge 
does not afford counsel the opportunity to speak and does not conduct a foil and fair 
sentencing hearing, a procedural anomaly requiring review exists. See Irwin, 924 P.2d at 
11 (exceptional circumstances doctrine generally applies to rare procedural anomalies). 
In addition, the question of whether the trial judge imposed a legal sentence is of 
widespread interest as evidenced by the number of cases before this Court raising a 
similar issue. Id. (doctrine of exceptional circumstances may be applied where "matters 
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of extraordinary importance or widespread interest" exist). Without appellate review, the 
egregious violation of due process, Utah R. Crim. P. 22 and the right to presence which 
occurred in this case would go unchecked. In this case where the trial judge had the 
obligation to conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing and failed to do so, exceptional 
circumstances require that this Court review the issue on appeal. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following rules and constitutional provisions is in Addendum E: 
Utah R. Crim. 17(a)(2); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12; 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 7, 2000, the state charged Vicente with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, on or about March 4, 
2000 (R. 02). On August 15, 2000, Vicente pled guilty to attempted unlawful possession 
of marijuana with intent to distribute, a class A misdemeanor, before the Honorable 
William W. Barrett (R. 67[l]:l-5). Judge Barrett scheduled sentencing for September 8, 
2000 before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick (R. 33, 35). When Vicente failed to 
appear at sentencing subsequently scheduled for September 22,2000, Judge Frederick 
sentenced Vicente to the maximum one year sentence (R. 44-45). This appeal follows. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
According to the probable cause statement in the Information, a police officer 
followed another individual to a residence where Vicente answered the door (R. 03). The 
officer searched the residence and found five ounces of marijuana and a drug scale 
(R. 03). 
At the plea colloquy before Judge Barrett, defense counsel indicated that the state 
would recommend thirty days jail with credit for time served (R. 67[1]:1). Vicente had 
served 15-20 days in jail when he pled guilty, and was released pending sentencing. The 
record contains a form indicating the date of sentencing as September 8, 2000 and 
referring Vicente to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for a presentence report (R. 33). 
The form is in English. Vicente speaks Spanish and had an interpreter at the plea 
colloquy (R. 67[l]:l-5,23). 
Although Judge Barrett told Vicente (through an interpreter) at the plea hearing 
that he must go to AP&P for a presentence report, the judge did not tell Vicente when he 
must go or the location of the AP&P office (R. 67[l]:4-5). Judge Barrett also did not tell 
Vicente on the record at the plea hearing the date on which sentencing would be held 
(R. 67[1]). Nothing in the record demonstrates that Vicente was informed in Spanish of 
the date of sentencing or that sentencing would occur before Judge Frederick. 
On September 11, 2000, Judge Frederick revoked Vicente's release and issued an 
arrest warrant because Vicente had not appeared at AP&P for preparation of a 
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presentence report (R. 41). Sentencing was somehow rescheduled for September 22, 
2000. The record does not reflect whether Vicente appeared at the courtroom of Judge 
Barrett or Judge Frederick on September 8, 2000 or whether Vicente was informed of the 
change in sentencing date. 
On September 22, 2000, when Vicente did not appear before Judge Frederick for 
sentencing, without affording either party the opportunity to speak, Judge Frederick 
concluded that Vicente had voluntarily absented himself (R. 67[2]:l-2). Despite the 
recommendation of thirty days jail with credit for time served, Judge Frederick sentenced 
Vicente to the maximum one year jail sentence (R. 44). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge violated Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process by failing to afford 
the parties an opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing and by otherwise 
failing to base the sentence on relevant information or to conduct a full and fair 
sentencing hearing. Imposing a maximum sentence based solely on the failure to appear 
without considering the nature and circumstances of the crime, defendant's background or 
society's interests and without affording the parties the opportunity to present information 
relevant to sentencing violates the rule and due process and requires a new sentencing 
hearing. 
The trial judge further violated due process and the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
by sentencing Appellant in absentia. Appellant did not knowingly waive his right to 
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presence at sentencing in this case where the record does not establish that Appellant was 
informed of the September 22, 2000 sentencing date or that Judge Frederick would 
sentence him, and Appellant was not informed that he would be sentenced even if he were 
not present. The critical role of presence at sentencing requires that the right to presence 
not be lightly forfeited. In this case where Appellant did not waive his right to be present 
at sentencing, the trial court erred in sentencing him in absentia and the sentence must be 
vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT IN ABSENTIA TO THE 
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SENTENCE WITHOUT ANY INPUT 
FROM EITHER PARTY. 
Judge Frederick began the sentencing proceeding by stating, "this is yet another 
sentencing on which we have neither an appearance of the defendant or a report, is that 
correct, [Defense Counsel]?" (R. 67[2]:1). Without affording either party an opportunity 
to speak, Judge Frederick then stated: 
The defendant entered a plea of guilty on the, to a Class A 
Misdemeanor crime of attempted possession with intent to distribute and 
was given both oral and written notice to appear for the preparation of pre-
sentence report, failed to do so and has failed likewise to appear here today 
notwithstanding both written and oral notice to do so. 
It is my view, therefore, he has likewise voluntarily chosen not to 
appear and I will impose sentence accordingly. It is the judgment of this 
court that he serve the term provided by law in the Adult Detention Center 
one year for the Class A Misdemeanor crime and I will order a fine be 
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imposed of $2,500 plus a surcharge on the fine and commitment issued 
forthwith upon his arrest. 
(R. 67[2]:l-2). Judge Frederick then ordered the prosecutor to "likewise" prepare 
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 67[2]:2). 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R. 
CRIM. P. 22 WHEN HE SENTENCED VICENTE WITHOUT 
CONSIDERING RELEVANT AND RELIABLE INFORMATION AND 
WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PARTIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
SPEAK AT SENTENCING. 
The state and federal due process clauses lfrequire[] that a sentencing judge act on 
reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing sentence." 
Howejl, 707 P.2d at 118; see also Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071 (state and federal due 
process protections applicable to sentencing require that judge make sentencing decision 
based on reliable and relevant information); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 341 (1949) 
(due process requires full and fair sentencing hearing where sentencer imposes sentence 
which fits offender and the crime); Lipsky. 608 P.2d at 1247 (same). A sentence which is 
not based on reliable and relevant information must be vacated. See id. at 1071-75 
(vacating sentence based on unreliable hearsay report). 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) further attempts to effectuate the due process requirement 
of a fiill and fair sentencing hearing based on relevant and reliable information by 
requiring sentencing judges to give both the defendant and the prosecutor an opportunity 
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to present any information which might be material to the sentence. Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(a) states in part: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be 
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to 
present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added); see Howell 707 P.2d at 118 ("[t]o ensure 
fairness in the sentencing procedure, [Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)] directs trial courts to hear 
evidence from both the defendant and the prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to be 
imposed"). 
The plain language of Rule 22(a) places on the trial court the responsibility to 
afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak at sentencing and to present information 
relevant to sentencing.2 While Rule 22(a) mandates that the trial court give the parties the 
opportunity to speak at sentencing, due process as outlined in Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071, 
and Howell 707 P.2d at 118, requires that any sentence imposed by trial judges be based 
on reliable and relevant information. Working together, Rule 22(a) and due process 
require a trial judge to make sure that a fair and full sentencing hearing which meets due 
process requirements occurs. 
2
 Where a defendant is represented by counsel, defendant presents information 
through defense counsel. 
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In this case, the trial court did not afford defense counsel or the prosecutor the 
opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing. Failure to hold a full 
sentencing hearing and the concomitant failure to base the sentencing decision on 
complete and accurate information requires a new sentencing hearing pursuant to 
Johnson, Lipsky and Williams. In a case such as the present one where the trial judge did 
not afford defense counsel or the prosecutor the opportunity to present information 
pertinent to the sentencing decision, conducting a harmless error review would undermine 
the due process requirement of a full and fair sentencing hearing. Since defense counsel 
was not given the opportunity to present relevant information, complete information 
favorable to the defendant is not in the record. Moreover, the prosecutor had agreed to 
recommend that Vicente serve thirty days jail with credit for time served and then be 
placed on probation. Judge Frederick, who was not at the plea hearing when this 
agreement was made, was unaware of this recommendation. Since complete information 
mitigating the sentence is not in the record, conducting a harmless error review is difficult 
and not required under Johnson. 
Nonetheless, if this Court were to attempt a review for prejudice, the record in this 
case demonstrates harm caused by the court's failure to afford counsel the opportunity to 
consider information relevant to sentencing. The record demonstrates that the state was 
willing to recommend a relatively short jail sentence of thirty days (R. 67[1]:1). Nothing 
in the record suggests that this crime or Vicente's background required a more severe 
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sentence. Had Judge Frederick conducted a full and fair sentencing hearing, he would 
have been aware of the state's recommendation and the circumstances which supported it. 
Probation, not the maximum sentence, would have been likely. 
Vicente's nonappearance at sentencing does not alter the circumstances as to 
permit imposition of a maximum sentence. First, failing to appear at sentencing is 
punishable by other means and should not enter into the sentencing matrix. For example, 
a defendant who fails to appear at sentencing can be charged with a separate crime or held 
on a bench warrant after not appearing. In addition, if the judge sentences a defendant in 
absentia, the defendant loses the right to allocution which can play an important role in 
mitigating sentence; see discussion infra at 14-25 regarding impropriety of sentencing in 
absentia. 
Common sense dictates that imposing a maximum sentence based solely on a 
failure to appear at sentencing can result in sentences which are not appropriate in light of 
society's interests, the nature of the crime or the defendant's background, and which 
impact profoundly on criminal justice resources. Filling the jail with misdemeanants 
serving maximum sentences who are irresponsible regarding their court dates but who 
otherwise do not present a threat to society nor deserve severe punishment makes little 
sense. Instead, the sentencing decision is more appropriately based on a complete review 
of the nature of the crime and the background of the defendant. 
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Additionally, even if nonappearance at sentencing were considered in determining 
the appropriate sentence, it would be only one of several factors to be considered. 
"A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of his 
background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which 
underlie the criminal justice system." State v. McClendon. 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 
1980). In other words, pursuant to McClendon, Johnson and due process, a sentence must 
be based not only on the circumstances of the crime, but also on other factors such as the 
defendant's background and the interests of society. The crime in this case where 
Vicente pled guilty to attempting to possess marijuana was relatively benign. Nothing in 
the record suggests Vicente had an extensive criminal history or was involved in violence, 
and the state recommended a short jail sentence with probation. Under these 
circumstances, probation was likely and Vicente was prejudiced by the judge's failure to 
conduct a full sentencing hearing. 
As a final matter, even if this issue was not adequately preserved for review by the 
trial judge's ruling, it nevertheless was plain error requiring that the sentence be vacated. 
The error in failing to afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak on behalf of her 
client and in otherwise failing to base the sentencing decision on reliable and relevant 
information was obvious in light of Rule 22(a) and Johnson. See generally Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1208-09 (plain error occurs where error is obvious and prejudices defendant). The 
obviousness of the error in failing to afford counsel the opportunity to present information 
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relevant to sentencing is bolstered by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (7) (1999) which 
mandates that the trial judge receive any information regarding the appropriate sentence 
which the parties desire to present, and that such information "be presented in open court 
on the record and in the presence of the defendant.11 Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (7) 
(1999). 
While this due process error requires vacation of the sentence regardless of 
whether prejudice is apparent in the record (see discussion supra at 10), even if prejudice 
were required, the record demonstrates that Vicente was harmed by the judge's failure to 
conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing. As outlined supra at 11, the error in failing to 
afford defense counsel the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing 
prejudiced Vicente since the trial judge was not fully informed of the nature and 
circumstances of the crime or the state's recommendation for a lenient sentence. Had the 
trial judge been fully informed and considered all relevant and reliable information, 
probation would have been the appropriate sentence. 
In addition, exceptional circumstances require review of this issue. See Irwin, 924 
P.2d at 11. The irregular procedure which occurred in this case whereby the judge 
sentenced Vicente in absentia without affording either party the opportunity to speak is an 
exceptional circumstance which requires review. See discussion supra at 4. Without 
review, the flagrant violation of Vicente's right to due process which occurred in this case 
would not be scrutinized nor corrected. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R. 
CRIM. P. 22 BY SENTENCING VICENTE IN ABSENTIA. 
In addition to failing to comply with Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process in 
conducting the sentencing hearing without affording counsel the opportunity to present 
relevant information, Judge Frederick violated Rule 22, due process and Article I, 
section 12, Utah Constitution by sentencing Vicente in absentia. Article I, section 12, 
Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee 
the right to be present at sentencing. See Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1109-10; United States v. 
McPherson. 421 F.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Because the right to presence at 
sentencing is constitutionally guaranteed, the trial judge may not proceed in absentia 
unless the defendant waives the right to presence. 
1. The Record Does Not Demonstrate a Knowing Waiver of the Right to 
Presence at Sentencing. 
Any waiver of the right to be present at sentencing "must be voluntary and involve 
an intentional relinquishment of a known right.11 Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110 (further 
citation omitted). The burden is on the state to establish waiver, and a knowing and 
voluntary waiver may not be presumed by the trial court. State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677, 
678-79 (Utah 1986). 
In order to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to presence at sentencing, the 
defendant must, at the very least, be given notice of the proceedings. Anderson. 929 P.2d 
at 1110. In addition, the directive given the defendant must provide sufficient warning 
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that the hearing will proceed even if the defendant is not present for a knowing waiver of 
the right to presence to occur. McPherson. 421 F.2d at 1129-30. 
In Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111, the Supreme Court held that sentencing the 
defendant in absentia did not violate the defendant's right to allocution where the 
defendant was informed of the trial date and signed a written waiver of his right to be 
present. Id. at 1110-11. The Court recognized that the right to allocution at sentencing 
"is an inseparable part of the right to be present" found in Article I, section 12, Utah 
Constitution. Id. at 1111. Anderson waived his right to allocution by his voluntary 
absence after being informed of the trial date, his execution of a written waiver of his 
right to be present, his failure to appear at trial, and his failure to keep in touch with 
counsel or appear at sentencing. Id. at 1110-11. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Anderson is consistent with the McPherson 
approach of requiring that the defendant be informed that the proceeding will be held 
without him in order to have a knowing waiver3, and must be read in light of the facts and 
policy considerations relevant to the circumstances under which Anderson failed to 
3
 McPherson focused on the nature of the communication with the defendant, i.e. 
on whether the defendant was informed the hearing would proceed in his absence, in 
determining whether the defendant knowingly waived his right to presence. McPherson, 
421 F.2d at 1129-30. In fact, although the trial judge in McPherson made it clear that the 
defendant was to be present at sentencing and that serious consequences would occur if 
he was not, the appellate court concluded that a knowing waiver of the right to presence 
did not occur where the record did not show that the defendant was informed that the trial 
would proceed without him. Id. 
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appear. Because Anderson was warned of the consequences of failing to appear and had 
signed a written waiver of his right to presence in which he agreed to be tried in absentia, 
requiring that the defendant be warned of the consequences of nonappearance in order to 
find a knowing waiver of the right to presence fits squarely within the Anderson holding. 
See Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110. Relying on McPherson. the Anderson court stated, M[t]o 
intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the 
proceedings." Id. (citing McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1130). Since the notice required in 
McPherson was that sentencing would proceed without the defendant if he did not appear, 
this reliance on McPherson in Anderson requires that the defendant be given notice that 
the sentencing will occur even if he does not appear in order to sentence in absentia. 
Requiring that a defendant be informed that sentencing will proceed without him 
for there to be a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence is also consistent 
with United States Supreme Court case law interpreting Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. See Crosby 
v. United States. 506 U.S. 255,256,113 S.Ct. 748, 749, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). In 
Crosby, the Court recognized that it cannot be assumed that a defendant who fails to 
appear knows that a trial will go on without him. In fact, "'[s]ince the notion that trial 
may be commenced in absentia still seems to shock most lawyers, it would hardly seem 
appropriate to impute knowledge that this will occur to their clients.'" Crosby. 506 U.S. 
at 261 (citation omitted). Moreover, while under the federal rules, a trial may continue to 
conclusion when a defendant disappears after the trial has begun, a trial in absentia is not 
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permitted if the defendant fails to appear at the beginning of trial. Id. at 262 (citing 
Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S.17 (1973)). In making a distinction between absenting 
oneself mid-trial and not appearing at the beginning of trial for purposes of determining 
whether a defendant waived his right to presence, the Supreme Court recognized that a 
defendant who flees mid-trial knows that the trial has begun and will proceed without him 
whereas a defendant who does not appear at the beginning of trial has no such knowledge. 
Hence, while a knowing waiver of the right to presence occurs when a defendant flees 
mid-trial, a knowing waiver is not demonstrated when the defendant fails to appear at all. 
Although Anderson supports the McPherson approach, it also fails to control the 
issue before this Court because it involved circumstances which are different from those 
in the present case. The trial court properly tried Anderson in absentia based on a written 
waiver of the right to presence. In determining whether the subsequent sentencing could 
also be conducted in absentia, the Court looked to cases involving similar circumstances 
where a defendant was properly tried in absentia and had not shown up by the time of 
sentencing. Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110. Because it would create an anomaly to be able 
to try in absentia a defendant who affirmatively waived his right to presence but then be 
unable to sentence him, the Supreme Court held that sentencing Anderson in absentia 
after he had expressly waived his right to presence at trial was appropriate. Id. The 
Anderson court did not consider the current circumstances, however, where a defendant 
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who had not been informed at the plea hearing that sentencing would occur without him 
later failed to appear at sentencing. 
Moreover, because presence of the defendant at sentencing is even more critical 
than it is at trial, the right to presence at sentencing cannot be lightly forfeited. See 
United States v. Turner, 532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (1982); State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d 208, 209 
(Ariz. 1983). ,f[T]he common law has traditionally required that the defendant be present 
at his sentencing.11 Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915; United States v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952, 
955 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) ("The requirement that the defendant be present 
when sentence is passed has deep common law origins.5"). Presence is of critical 
importance to sentencing not only because it allows the judge to be presented with all of 
the information needed for a foil and fair sentencing, but also because it allows the judge 
to question and admonish the defendant. Indeed, "[i]t is only when the defendant is 
before the court that a reasonable and rational sentencing can take place." Fettis, 664 
P.2d at 209. 
Presence is of instrumental value to the defendant for the exercise of other 
rights, such as to present mitigating evidence and challenge aggravating 
evidence, and it may also be advantageous to him that the decision maker 
be required to face him. The state may have an interest in the presence of 
the defendant in order that the example of personal admonition might deter 
others from similar crimes. Moreover, it may sometimes be important that 
the convicted man be called to account publicly for what he has done, not to 
be made an instrument of the general deterrent, but to acknowledge 
symbolically his personal responsibility for his acts and to receive 
personally the official expression of society's condemnation for his 
conduct. The ceremonial rendering of judgment may also contribute to the 
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individual deterrent force of the sentence if the latter is accompanied by 
appropriate judicial comment on the defendant's crime. 
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915. 
Presence of the defendant at sentencing also preserves the dignity of the 
individuals being sentenced as well as the court and the system itself. 
Respect for the dignity of the individual is at the base of the right of a man 
to be present when society authoritatively proceeds to decide and announce 
whether it will deprive him of liberty. It shows a fundamental lack of 
respect for the dignity of a man to sentence him in absentia. The presence 
of the defendant indicates that society has sufficient confidence in the 
justness of its judgment to announce it in public to the convicted man 
himself. Presence thus enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of both 
sentence and conviction. 
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The important 
policy considerations relating to presence at sentencing require that the right to presence 
at sentencing not be easily waived. See id. at 915 (important policy considerations 
supporting right to presence at sentencing "militate against a rule allowing presence at 
sentencing to be lightly waived"). 
Because of the critical importance of presence to sentencing, many jurisdictions 
refuse to allow sentencing in absentia except in extraordinary circumstances. Fettis, 664 
P.2d at 209. Such extraordinary circumstances, while "rare indeed" (id.), may include 
circumstances where a defendant has expressly waived his right to be present at 
sentencing. See Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 916 (citation omitted). Extraordinary 
circumstances allowing sentencing in absentia may also include circumstances where the 
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defendant has been folly informed that sentencing will proceed in his absence if he does 
not appear at the sentencing hearing. See Lowery v. State. 759 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ark. 
1988) (court unwilling to find defendant waived the right to presence at sentencing "in the 
absence of language specifically advising an accused that he is subject to being sentenced 
prospectively without his being present"); People v. Link, 685 N.E.2d 624, 626 (111. App. 
1997) (court requires that defendant must be "warned his failure to appear may result in 
the proceedings continuing in absentia" in order to sentence a defendant in absentia); 
People v. Bennett. 557 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (court reasons that 
sentencing in absentia was permissible where defendant was fully advised that sentencing 
would occur in his absence if he failed to appear); People v. Harris, 564 N.Y.S.2d 481 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (same); People v. Christopher R.. 522 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1987) (same). These cases support the notion that at the very least, a defendant must be 
informed that the sentencing will occur even if he is not present in order to knowingly 
waive his right to presence. 
While Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) facilitates due process and the Article I, section 12, 
Utah Constitution right to appear and defend by allowing a defendant to speak and 
present information relevant to sentencing, Rule 22(b) allows sentencing to proceed even 
though the defendant is not present "[o]n the same grounds that a defendant may be tried 
in defendant's absence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b). The grounds on which a defendant may 
be tried in his absence are circumstances where the defendant has knowingly and 
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voluntarily waived his right to presence; in the context of sentencing, a knowing waiver 
does not occur unless the defendant has been informed that the sentencing will proceed 
even if he is not present. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2), which recognizes that in order to proceed in absentia at 
trial, the defendant must knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to presence, does not 
affect the determination of whether the constitutional right to presence at sentencing was 
waived. Utah R. Crim P. 17(a)(2) states in part, "[i]n prosecutions for offenses not 
punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to 
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or 
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present." 
While this rule suggests that voluntary absence from trial after notice of the time for trial 
constitutes a knowing waiver of the right to presence at trial, it does not outline what 
constitutes a knowing waiver of the right to presence at sentencing. More importantly, 
even if Rule 17(a)(2) applied to sentencing hearings rather than trial, the Article I, 
section 12 right to presence at sentencing would override the rule. Because of the greater 
importance of presence at sentencing, the fundamental, common law roots in requiring 
presence at sentencing and the lack of awareness by most people that a sentencing will be 
held if the defendant is not present, the right to presence at sentencing cannot be waived 
except in extraordinary circumstances which may include circumstances where the 
defendant was informed that the sentencing would be held even if he did not appear. 
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In the present case, the record fails to demonstrate that Vicente knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to be present at sentencing. Vicente speaks Spanish, used an 
interpreter at the plea hearing and signed a plea form which was in English and Spanish 
(R. 23, 24, 33, 35, 67[l]:l-5). At the plea hearing, Judge Barrett referred Vicente to 
AP&P and told Vicente, through an interpreter, he must go to AP&P for the preparation 
of a presentence report (R. 67[l]:4-5). Judge Barrett did not, however, orally state that 
Vicente must return for sentencing or the date on which the sentencing would be held or 
the fact that the sentencing would be held before a different judge, Judge Frederick 
(R. 67[l]:l-5). Judge Frederick's finding that Vicente was orally informed of the 
sentencing date is therefore clearly erroneous. 
The record also fails to demonstrate that Vicente was informed of the 
September 22, 2000 sentencing date. The district court file contains a copy of a form 
which was filled out on the date of the plea hearing and which indicates that sentencing is 
to be held on September 8, 2000 (R. 33). That form is in English and there is nothing in 
the record demonstrating that the information in the form was conveyed to Vicente in 
Spanish. Moreover, sentencing was somehow rescheduled for September 22, 2000, and 
there is nothing in the record indicating that Vicente was ever informed of that date. 
Vicente may well have appeared in the courtroom of Judge Frederick or Judge Barrett on 
September 8, 2000. While the record does demonstrate that Vicente was informed in 
Spanish at the plea hearing that he needed to go to AP&P for preparation of a presentence 
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report, the failure to go to AP&P does not establish that Vicente knew of the sentencing 
date and knowingly failed to appear. In addition, Vicente was not informed that 
sentencing would proceed without him if he did not appear. 
Because Vicente was not informed of the sentencing date and, further, was not 
informed that sentencing would proceed without him, Judge Frederick incorrectly 
concluded that Vicente knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to presence at 
sentencing. The trial judge therefore erred in sentencing Vicente in absentia. 
2. The Public Interest Did Not Require That Vicente Be Sentenced in 
Absentia. 
In determining whether the right to presence has been waived thereby allowing for 
sentencing in absentia, a trial court must also weigh whether the public interest in 
proceeding without the defendant outweighs the defendant's interest in being present. 
See Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1111 (court relies on practical considerations which supported 
proceeding with the sentencing in absentia); United States v. Fontanez. 878 F.2d 33, 36 
(2d Cir. 1989) (court considers whether public interest in proceeding with sentencing in 
absentia outweighed defendant's interest in being present in deciding whether to uphold 
sentencing in absentia). 
In Anderson, the Supreme Court upheld the sentencing in absentia after concluding 
that"[practical considerations . . . mitigate[d] in favor of in absentia sentencing." 
Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1111. Anderson had executed a written waiver of his right to be 
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present, then left the state. The Court was concerned that Anderson could absent himself 
for years "and the eventual sentencing would have to be performed by a judge who was 
unfamiliar with the case and had no access to relevant information." Id. 
Concerns about dilatory defendants who attempt to delay the administration of 
justice by failing to appear at sentencing are remedied by requiring trial judges to exercise 
their discretion to proceed in absentia by balancing "the public interest in proceeding 
[without the defendant]" against the defendant's interest in being present. Smith v. Mann, 
173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 120 S.Ct. 200; see also Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 
36-37; People v. Parker, 440 N.E.2d 131, 137 (N.Y. 1982). Requiring that trial courts 
balance the public interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present 
ensures that trial courts "vigorously safeguard" the right to presence. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 
at 36. 
The factors to be considered when balancing the public interest in proceeding in 
absentia against the defendant's interest in being present include whether there is a 
possibility that the defendant could be contacted and brought to court within a reasonable 
amount of time, the difficulty in rescheduling the sentencing hearing, the burden on the 
state in not proceeding, and whether there is a possibility that information relevant to 
sentencing will be lost. See Parker, 440 N.E.2d at 1317; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 36; 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. 
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In this case, Judge Frederick erred in sentencing Vicente in absentia where the 
judge did not balance the public interest in proceeding against Vicente's interest in being 
present, and the record fails to demonstrate that the public interest required that Vicente 
be sentenced in absentia. Continuing the sentencing hearing to another date would not 
have been difficult; sentencing hearings take a relatively short amount of time and are 
often rescheduled. The state would not have been burdened by a continuance since it 
presented no information pertinent to sentencing; the state could have easily done the 
same thing if the sentencing had been rescheduled, and there was no threat that 
information relevant to sentencing would be lost if sentencing were rescheduled. Since 
Judge Frederick had taken the case from another judge, was not present when the plea 
was taken and had no specific knowledge that would be lost, the public had no interest in 
maintaining him as the judge; even if a delay in sentencing caused reassignment of the 
case, information pertinent to sentencing would not be lost and the effective 
administration of justice would not be undermined since Judge Frederick did not sit 
through the trial as the Anderson judge had, and did not take the plea. 
Vicente's fundamental, critical interest in being present for sentencing was not 
outweighed by the public interest in proceeding. The trial judge therefore erred in 
sentencing Vicente in absentia and the sentence must be vacated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Jose Vicente respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
sentence and remand his case for a full and fair sentencing hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ZOU day of March, 2001. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
NISA J. SISNEROS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies 
of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. 0. Box 
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this JjQttL day of March, 2001. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of March, 2001. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSE LUIS CASTRO VICENTE, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cindyb 
Prosecutor: MURPHY, J KEVIN 
Defendant not present 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SISNEROS, NISA J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Language: S PANISH 
Date of birth: May 4, 1973 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 10:39-10:40 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST (amended) 
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/15/2000 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED POSS W/INTENT TO 
DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s) 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991907447 FS 
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: Sentember 22. 2000 
Case No: 991907447 
Date: Sep 22, 2000 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $2125.00 
Due: $4625.00 
Total Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $2125.00 
Total Principal Due: $4625.00 
Plus Interest 
Pay fine to The Court. 
The Court finds defendant voluntarily absented himself from 
sentencing proceedings and the Court sentences the defendant in 
absentia. Counsel for the State to prepare the findings and order. 
Defendant to be committed forthwith upon his arrest on this 
Court's bench waifrant. 
Mr 
Dated t h i s / A ' d a y of 
ma» 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintifi/Appellee, 
JOSE LUIS C. VINCENTE, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 991907447 FS 
August 15, 2000 
September 22,2000 
PLEA HEARING 
SENTENCING 
BEFORE 
Page 1 
Tab 2 
THE HONORABLES J. DENNIS FREDERICK and WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
« • 5 "\ 
FILED 
3EC 0 / 2UUU 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRmfiPURT OF APPEAL^ 
1775 E. Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
6UXOC0&5 -cK 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: J. KEVIN MURPHY 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
231 East 400 South #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For the Defendant: NISA J. SISNEROS 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
* * * 
1 SALT LAKE COUNTY; UTAH SEPTEMBER 22, 2000 
2 HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: All right, Miss Sisneros, thank you. Do 
5 you have any other matter, another non-show right? 
6 MS. SISNEROS: One other, a Jose Vicente, number 24. 
7 THE COURT: Very well this is yet another sentencing 
8 on which we have neither an appearance of the Defendant or a 
9 report, is that correct, Ms. Sisneros? 
10 MS. SISNEROS: That is correct. 
11 THE COURT: And you have no knowledge as to this 
12 Defendant's present whereabouts likewise? 
13 MS. SISNEROS: No, I don't. 
14 THE COURT: In this matter, this is case number 
15 CR997447, the Defendant entered a plea of guilty on the, to a 
16 Class A Misdemeanor crime of attempted possession with intent 
17 to distribute and was given both oral and written notice to 
18 appear for the preparation of pre-sentence report, failed to do 
19 so and has failed likewise to appear here today not 
20 withstanding both written and oral notice to do so. 
21 It is my view therefore, he has likewise voluntarily 
22 chosen not to appear and I will impose sentence accordingly. It 
23 is the judgment of this court that he serve the term provided 
24 by law in the Adult Detention Center one year for the Class A 
25 Misdemeanor crime and I will order a fine be imposed of $2,500 
1 
1 plus a surcharge on the fine and commitment issued forthwith 
2 upon his arrest. A warrant has been previously issued. 
3 Likewise Mr. Murphy findings of fact and conclusions and order. 
4 MR. MURPHY: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: All right, Ms. Sisneros does that take 
6 care of your matters? 
7 MS. SISNEROS: That's all I have Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
9 (Whereupon the hearing was concluded). 
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CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in 
the before mentioned hearing held before Judge J. Dennis 
Frederick was transcribed by me from a videotape 
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the 
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best 
of my ability. 
Signed this 24th day of November 2000 in Sandy, 
Utah, 
.ZAAcJ^I^ 
Carolyn tfSrickson 
C e r t i f i e d Shorthand Repor te r 
C e r t i f i e d Court T r a n s c r i b e r 
My Commission e x p i r e s May 4, 2002 
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ADDENDUM C 
NISA J. SISNEROS (6654) . . -' <:?£?- r w 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorney for Defendant 00 SE? 29 All 6- 31 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 . 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO CORRECT 
ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
Plaintiff, 
-v- : 
JOSE LUIS CASTRO VICENTE, : Case No. 991907447FS 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Defendant. : 
Defendant, Jose Luis Castro Vicente, by and through counsel, Nisa J. Sisneros, hereby objects 
to the sentence imposed by the court on September 22,2000 and moves the court to correct it's 
illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, State v. 
Wagstaff. 772 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 
1996). Mr. Vicente was not present at the sentencing. The court found that he had voluntarily 
absented himself from the proceedings and sentenced him to the maximum jail sentence allowed 
by law. However, Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states a defendant is 
entitled to "make a statement and to present any mitigation of punishment, or show any legal 
cause why sentence should not be imposed". Any imposition of sentence without Mr. Vicente's 
presence violated his rights to due process and to allocution as found in the Constitution of Utah 
Ml 
art. I, §§ 7 & 12, and the 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. In 
addition counsel for Mr. Vicente was not given the opportunity to address sentencing. At the 
time of sentencing both the court and counsel were unaware as to why Mr. Vicente was not 
present. 
Rule 22 (b) allows the court to issue a bench warrant if a defendant fails to appear for 
sentencing. Therefore, Mr. Vicente requests that the court correct it's sentence and issue a bench 
warrant for his arrest allowing him to address the court prior to being sentenced. 
Mr. Vicente requests the court set this matter for hearing. 
DATED this 27th day of September, 2000. 
Nfc^J.SISMEROS 
Attorney forlJDefendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this day of September, 2000. 
ADDENDUM D 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KEVIN MURPHY, 5768 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
f U D DISTBICT COURT 
Third
 t"-""cial Dlstriot 
OCT-4 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSE LUIS C. VICENTE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND ORDER SENTENCING 
DEFENDANT IN ABSENTIA 
Case No. < ? 3 1 ^ 0 1 4 4 7 
DA Case Mo. 9900+536 
[Hon. Judge Frederick 
This case was called for sentencing on September 22, 2000. The State was represented 
by Kevin Murphy of the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office; defense counsel Nisa 
Sisneros was present. However, defendant did not appear. The court enters the following— 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court record reflects, and the Court finds, that defendant had written and oral 
notice of the September 22, 2000, 8:30 AM sentencing hearing. 
2. The Court finds that defendant has voluntarily absented him/herself from the sentencing 
hearing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b), it is appropriate that the defendant be sentenced in 
absentia. 
ORDERS 
1. Based upon his conviction for Attempted Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent 
to Distribute, a class A misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of one year 
in the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Center. 
2. The defendant is sentenced to pay a fine of $2500.00. 
3. A no-bail warrant is issued for the defendant's arrest. 
4. Defendant's one year jail commitment shall commence upon his/her arrest and booking 
into the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Center on the warrant. 
DATED this j ^ d a y of Septarotr, 2000. 
BY T$E COURT 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order Sentencing Defendant in Absentia was delivered to Nisa 
Sisneros, Attorney for Defendant Jose Vicente at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 on the^T day of September, 2000. 
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ADDENDUM E 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may con-
sent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec 7. [Due process of law J 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
coNsmrniON OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
